Violence in Rural China

 

In the beginning of Fanshen, violence was a part of every day life as the strong exerted their power over the weak. By the end of the story, violence was rare, isolated acts perpetrated by individuals. In Chen Village violence is practiced within the context of political campaigns, less common in everyday life, but with the opening of the Hong Kong border, violence becomes a means of enforcing power, directed at the newcomers to the village. The change in both cases is considerable, and different factors motivate the change. In Fanshen, the growth of the Communist party and the institutions created by the Communist government make the use of violence unnecessary, giving the people a forum for their grievances so that they were not required to take matters into their own hands. In Chen Village, the decollectivization of the village and the introduction of income from Hong Kong recreated the deficit between the rich and the poor that land reform had destroyed, and the rich once again felt obliged to protect their wealth against those who must envy it. In both villages, several changes in the role of violence took place over the years.

Prior to land reform in Long Bow village, violence was practiced in all strata of the population, and it was directed downward, from the strong (politically, socially, or physically) to the weak. Among the peasant population, force was a method of resolving conflict, in which "The strong won the day and the weak ‘ate bitterness.’" (F 50-51) When administered by the landlords, violence was largely punitive, a way of administering punishment and enforcing power, or used in order to coerce those who didn’t bow to the wishes of those in power. Violence was practiced overtly by the gentry, making it a deterrent to others who might wish to challenge the status quo. This fear of revenge, both in the form of physical punishment and material dispossession, shaped the behavior of the citizens of Long Bow throughout land reform. By the completion of land reform, violence had been abolished in most of these roles. Violence was not an acceptable means of punishment, and those who committed violence did so in an attempt to disrupt the status quo rather than maintain it. Violence had to be committed in secret for the perpetrators to avoid punishment by the authorities.

Before the arrival of the Communists, "Violence was chronic at all levels of human relationship." (F 51) Because of the inability of the village office to dispense satisfactory judgements to the poor, the peasants had no way to resolve the irresolvable except through violence. Violence and the ability to commit violent acts without retribution maintained the rule of the strong over the weak. Beatings were handed down from the top: "Husbands beat their wives, mothers-in-law beat their daughters-in-law, peasants beat their children, landlords beat their tenants, and the Peace Preservation Corps beat anyone who got in the way." (F 51) Violence was executed in the context of this social hierarchy, allowing each tier to maintain power over the tier below it. When this hierarchy was challenged, such as when a peasant stole from a landlord or failed to pay back a debt, retribution was administered. Even in cases where the two parties were related, the punishment was severe, and attempts to resist only resulted in worse punishments (F 52). Violence during this period was used to maintain the structure of power.

As the Communists took over, the pattern of violence remained the same, but the social and political hierarchy reversed itself. Now those who had previously been subjected to beatings were administering them. The purpose of violence in this context was to destroy the status quo rather than to preserve it, to create a new order rather than to guard the current order. Vengeance was a strong motivator in these cases, as the case of Ch’ung-lai’s wife demonstrated: "I beat you in revenge for six years of beatings. In the past you never cared for us. Your eyes did not know us. Now my eyes do not know you either. Now it is my turn." (F 140) Violence was also used in the early stages of the land reform movement as coercion for those who refused to give up their wealth, as in the case of Ch’ung-wang, whose wealth was beaten from him a cache at a time (F 135-136).

In the later stages of land reform, the role of violence changed once more as the peasants’ viewpoint changed: "The peasants supported violence in smashing the old regime. But violence for loot alone, violence that was basically punitive, violence that turned on those who practiced it, turned out to be stark, senseless, repellant." (F 224) As the peasantry turned away from violence, those in power, the cadres, seemed to turn increasingly toward it as a side effect of the "commandism" style of administration they were adopting (F 224-225). Violence became once again a reinforcement of authority and a means of compelling the peasants to comply with the cadres’ wishes (F 226-231). This violence was answered, not with further violence this time, but instead with public criticism. Criticism sessions and the gate served to give vent to the people’s grievances, and violence became unnecessary as the cadres submitted to the authority granted to the peasants by the government. The peasants sought through this process to improve the current regime rather than destroy it.

In final stage of land reform violence could no longer be used in any official capacity either to compel or punish. "…violence is not the answer to the excesses of individualism that now give us so much trouble," the cadres were told (F 525). Violence in this era existed for the most part as criminal acts of aggression between two parties. Violence as an enforcement method was replaced by the People’s Congress and the People’s Court. Violence became the weapon of dissidents, such as in the case of Ken-pao, who was believed to be the puppet of a dissident element in the village (F 579-581). The concept of reform took the place of violent punishment in the punitive system.

"Considering the seriousness of the crime, the punishment meted out to Ken-pao was mild indeed. A year earlier he could well have been severely thrashed, driven into exile, even beaten to death…In effect, what the Congress offered him was an opportunity to reform."

(F 581)

Violence in Chen Village was not so obvious. There are indications of violence prior to Liberation, committed by landlords and directed at peasants who were unable to pay. Post-Liberation, status was based on one’s ability to work, and later, one’s devotion to Chairman Mao and the Party, rather than one’s ability to subdue others. Violence became an instrument for displaying revolutionary zeal or humiliating a struggle object during the Four Cleanups and the Cultural Revolution. Violence was occasionally used to punish and intimidate, but these instances were exceptions and did not meet with public approval. After the opening of the Hong Kong border opened, drawing workers from outside villages to Chen Village, violence seemed to reappear in its old role, supporting the rich against the poor, punishing the weak for transgressions against the strong.

It is not unreasonable to say that the story of Chen Village picks up where the story of Long Bow Village leaves off. However, differences in the two cases must be noted. Chen Village had only two landlords and five rich peasants, and its residents had the solidarity of a lineage association between them. Violence may not have existed prior to Liberation to the extent that it did in Long Bow village, though the landlords at least participated in violence similar to that practiced in Long Bow: "Those landlords were fierce; they’d beaten people who hadn’t paid all their rents." (CV 21) The rich peasants for the most part did not seem to participate in the same sort of violence (CV 21). While the lack of violence in Chen Village may well be a result of the land reforms, there is not enough information provided to say whether the change was as drastic as the one that took place in Long Bow.

Regardless of the cause, violence in Chen Village during the Great Leap Forward, the Four Cleanups, and the Cultural Revolution was not nearly so prominent in societal relations as it was in Long Bow during Liberation and land reform. Status in the village depended not on a person’s ability to intimidate or physically coerce others, but on a person’s class background, working ability, and political activism. Qingfa’s career is a good example. He had good class background, he was active in the denunciation of the landlords, and he was a strong laborer (CV 27-29). His violent temper actually turns out to be a detriment to him in the community. While he could and did physically intimidate and occasionally strike people, this became a weakness as he was criticized in the Four Cleanups:

"The workteam had the incident [where Qingfa struck two teenagers] phrased in dramatic political terms: Even the landlords never beat people themselves, yet Qingfa dared beat up the poor and lower-middle peasants! A big crime indeed!"

(CV 62)

Violence still found its place in Chen Village. Minor violence tended to occur as an expression of revolutionary enthusiasm in campaigns like the Four Cleanups: "The general psychology of most peasants was that they must at all cost show their activism; they’d even walk up to give [the cadres] one or two slaps in the face." (CV 56) Violence was not used during the Four Cleanups campaign to exhort confessions, but these minor acts served to humiliate the struggle objects and display the peasant’s activism. However, violence was used during the Cleansing of the Class Ranks campaign in struggle sessions to coerce confessions and repentance (CV 146). The Cultural Revolution brought some disorder from the two Red Guard groups, but what disturbance they managed to create consisted more of property damage than violence against people (CV 118).

The Cleansing of the Class Ranks campaign was the most violent of those undertaken in Chen Village. The struggle objects for this campaign were treated harshly in an attempt to inspire repentance and humility, to get them to admit their wrongs. However, the need to fit the 3% led to a broader attack. Violence in these cases became an opportunity for vengeance, or an expression of the suspicions and dislikes the people had held over time, as in the case of the former Guomindang security officer (CV 163) or the old widow of a rich peasant (CV 164).

Violence emerges in this same capacity after the opening of the Hong Kong border. As the prosperous area drew workers from poorer regions, the Chens grew suspicious of these camps of outsiders.

"The Chens reasoned that if they were in the outsiders’ shoes—still impoverished and living next door to idle occupants of villas such as their own—they would feel resentful, and so they imputed such hostility—and vengeful acts—to the newcomers."

The result was vengeance-related violence against any of these outsiders who were found committing crimes, such as the young man who was beaten to death for stealing from an orchard (CV 303-304). This seems a brutal overreaction to the simple theft of some fruit, but the beating also served as a deterrent to other outsiders. The situation parallels the situation in Long Bow before Liberation, where landlords reinforced their power by exacting vengeance on peasants that challenged them.

In Long Bow, the role of violence diminishes as the government takes over more and more. As the old institutions are replaced with more effective peasant-run organizations, such as the People’s Congress, the need to resort to violence to deal with grievances diminishes. In Chen Village, the lack of strong governmental policies allows violence to reassert itself, particularly as the opening of the border created a deficit between the rich and the poor. The constant shifts in government policy and leadership in the village led to a disintegration of the institutions that were so effective in Long Bow, allowing violence to return as a solution for the people’s new problems.